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Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-FEDERAL COURT CANNOT ORDER
MULTI-SCHOOL DISTRICT REMEDY FOR SINGLE DISTRICT DE JURE SEGREGATION
ABSENT AN I.NTERDISTRICT VIOLATION, Milliken v. Bradley, 94 S. Ct. 3112
(1974).
The landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Education' held that the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 2 prohibited a state
from maintaining racially segregated public schools. After years of at-
tempted but ineffective implementation of the mandate of Brown I, the
Supreme Court attacked the issue with vigor in the late 1960's.1 State and
local authorities- were placed under an affirmative duty to convert to a
unitary school system which promised to work immediately towards the
elimination of the discrimination inherent in state compelled dual school
systems.4
Federal district courts and local school authorities were still left with
imprecise guidelines for effectuating remedies once a constitutional viola-
tion had been established.5 The Court responded by holding that when
school authorities were in default of their duty to remedy de jure segrega-
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1). The Court, in a supplemental opinion, held that federal
courts implementing the principle of Brown I were to be guided by equitable principles, and
were to retain jurisdiction during the period of transition in order to consider the adequacy
of any plans proposed by school authorities to effectuate a unitary school system. Brown v.
Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown 11).
2. "No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
3. The Brown I decision effectively repealed any state statutory requirement of a dual
school system, but authorities in those southern states were slow to dismantle their dual
school systems and engaged in certain dilatory tactics to avoid actual school desegregation.
State interposition acts and school closings were among the more blatant methods employed.
See generally UNTED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVI RIGHTS, 1959 REPorr 228, 233-34 (overview
of southern interposition acts); UNrrFm STATm COMISSION ON CivL RIGHTS, 1961 RPomR, bk.
2 at 65-77. The Supreme Court struck down these tactics. See Griffin v. County School Bd.,
377 U.S. 218 (1964) (holding that a public school cannot be closed down to avoid desegrega-
tion); Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Bush, 365 U.S. 569 (1961), aff'g mem., 188 F. Supp. 916
(E.D. La. 1960) (striking down Louisiana's interposition statutes as unconstitutional).
A more covert form of avoiding school desegregation was the use of the "freedom of choice"
plan, but this method was successfully attacked as well. Green v. County School Bd., 391
U.S. 430 (1968).
4. See, e.g., Alexander v. Holmes Co. Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Green v. County
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
5. Chief Justice Burger, concurring in Northcross v. Board of Educ., 397 U.S. 232, 236
(1970), referred to the need for more precise guidelines as to: 1) whether any specific racial
balance was required in schools; 2) whether the Constitution requires that school districts and
attendance zones be altered; and 3) to what extent transportation of students must be pro-
vided.
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tion within a school district, federal courts had broad powers to fashion a
remedy insuring a unitary school system.'
The Court had not dealt with the problem of a federal court's power to
alter school districts to remedy racial segregation in a given area.7 It was
precisely this remedy which offered the only viable means of attack in large
metropolitan areas, particularly in the North, which operate the equiva-
lent of dual school systems due to widespread residential segregation.'
Absent an interdistrict busing program or a renovation of school district
boundary lines, no significant racial balance can be achieved.,
Any solution to this problem would have required a shift in the Court's
6. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971). Busing and the
alteration of attendance zones were validated as means of achieving school desegregation. The
extent of a court's power to order the transportation of students to effectuate a desegregation
remedy was limited by the practicalities of time and distance factors. Id. at 29-31. See also
Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971). As to racial quotas, the Court held
that the Constitution does not require that the racial makeup of every school reflect the racial
composition of the school system. The Court stated:
If we were to read the holding of the District Court to require, as a matter of substan-
tive constitutional right, any particular degree of racial balance or mixing ... we
would be obliged to reverse. The constitutional command to desegregate schools does
not mean that every school in every community must always reflect the racial composi-
tion of the school system as a whole. Id. at 24.
7. See note 5 supra. Chief Justice Burger also delivered the opinion in Swann. The Chief
Justice addressed the issues of racial quotas and busing which he had earlier indicated in
Northcross needed more precise guidelines. However, the question concerning the permissible
extent of school district alteration was not considered.
Subsequent decisions dealt with one aspect of the problem. A federal court has the power
to enjoin local officials from altering school districts where the effect would be to foster racial
segregation or impede the process of dismantling a segregated school system. See, e.g., United
States v. Scotland Neck Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972); Wright v. Council of the City of
Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
8. In such situations a federal court is faced with the problem of a predominantly black
public school system in the city surrounded by predominantly white suburban school sys-
tems.
9. After Swann it was felt that the Court had laid sufficient doctrinal groundwork to attack
the specific problems of metropolitan area school desegregation. See generally Fiss, The
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case-Its Significance for Northern School Desegregation, 38 U. Cm.
L. Rxv. 697 (1971); Smedley, Developments in the Law of School Desegregation, 26 VAND. L.
REv. 405 (1973); Comment, Interdistrict Segregation: Finding a Violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, 23 AM. U.L. REV. 785 (1974); Note, Merging Urban and Suburban School
Systems, 60 GEo. L.J. 1279 (1972).
A strident pace had been set in Green and built upon in Swann. The Swann decision held
that school authorities must make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual
desegregation. 402 U.S. at 26. The Green decision emphasized that the evil to be attacked
was the racial identification of a school system's schools. 391 U.S. at 435. A metropolitan area,
as a whole, reflects a pattern of racially identifiable schools. The mandate that actual desegre-
gation be achieved would seem to require that the areawide pattern be eliminated.
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analysis. Remedies in school desegregation cases are predicated upon a
finding of de jure segregation within a school system, which contemplates
that the state is operating a dual school system under color of law.1" The
Court has consistently refused to apply remedies to de facto segregation.'1
In the case of de facto segregation, separate white schools and black schools
exist, but they are the product of neighborhood assignment plans superim-
posed on a residentially segregated community. Since no constitutional
violation can be based upon de facto segregation, 2 any judicial response
to the problems in northern metropolitan areas would require an expanded
concept of state action. 3
10. Brown I contains no reference to the state action requirement, however, school desegre-
gation cases are directed at alleged violations of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
guarantee and thus operate within the framework of the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)
(fourteenth amendment protection is limited to cases of perceptible state action). Reviewing
the decisions of the Court in the school desegregation area, it is clear that only state-imposed
or state-fostered segregation constitutes a violation. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,
413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green
v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
The Court noted in Keyes that the differentiating factor between de jure and de facto
segregation is intent to segregate. 413 U.S. at 208. This particular distinction was raised in
the context of a school system where acts of purposeful segregation found in part of the system
were found attributable to the system as a whole. Id. at 208-09.
11. The Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of de facto segregation, but in
denying certiorari in cases where remedies were denied in de facto situations it has tacitly
upheld the proposition that there exists no affirmative duty on the part of school authorities
to cure a de facto condition. See, e.g., Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967); Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965); Bell v. School City, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1963).
12. This dichotomy has been criticized as insensitive to the fundamental issues involved
in the school desegregation area. Mr. Justice Douglas is particularly vexed at the denial of
remedies in de facto segregation cases. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 94 S. Ct. 3112, 3135
(1974) (dissenting opinion); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 215 (1973) (concurring
opinion). Mr. Justice Powell also registered his disregard for the de jure/de facto dichotomy
in his dissenting opinion in Keyes. Id. at 219.
District Judge Roth also attacked the distinction in his opinion in Bradley v. Milliken,
commenting that "[i]t is . . . unfortunate that we cannot deal with public school segrega-
tion on a no-fault basis, for if racial segregation in our public schools is an evil, then it should
make no difference whether we classify it de jure or de facto." 338 F. Supp. 582, 592 (E.D.
Mich. 1971), aff'd, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 94 S. Ct. 3112 (1974). Yet the continued
application of the distinction appears certain. See, e.g., Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F. Supp. 1235
(D.N.J. 1971), afl'd, 404 U.S. 1027 (1972).
13. The concept of de jure segregation is viable in regard to the south which has had a
tradition of state-fostered dual school systems. The concept breaks down, however, in the case
of northern systems where no statutory scheme of school segregation existed prior to Brown
L
The only resolution to the problem can be found in expanding the scope of state action,
not only in regard to establishing a constitutional violation, but in regard to effectuating a
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The Supreme Court dealt with one effort to effectuate a metropolitan
areawide remedy in Milliken v. Bradley." The federal district court had
found acts of de jure segregation in the Detroit City School District, 5 and
in a supplemental opinion ordered a panel of experts to submit a plan
which contemplated the transportation of students across school district
lines.'" The court heard no evidence and made no finding that any school
district outside of Detroit had engaged in any unconstitutional activity, or
that the State of Michigan had drawn school district lines with the inten-
remedy. Within the context of a single school district the Court has found state action in any
showing of deliberate efforts by the state to maintain segregated schools. See, e.g., Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
Once the state is tagged with the responsibility of fostering de jure segregation the question
arises as to the permissible extent of the remedy. The residential patterns of multi-school
district metropolitan areas are such that a violation found within one school district cannot
be effectively remedied within the school district. Some justification must be found to charge
the state with effectuating an interdistrict remedy. One method would be to find the state
responsible for the residential patterns in the first place. See, e.g., Bradley v. Milliken, 338
F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971). The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to
reach this issue in affirming the lower court decision. 484 F.2d 215, 242 (6th Cir. 1973). Mr.
Justice Stewart, concurring in the reversal of the 6th Circuit decision, left the question open.
94 S. Ct. 3112, 3132. A second method would be to require that the state ignore school district
lines of its own creation which have the effect of maintaining racial segregation regardless of
the neutrality of their creation or maintenance. This latter method was rejected by the
Supreme Court. See Milliken v. Bradley, 94 S. Ct. 3112 (1974).
14. 94 S. Ct. 3112 (1974) (5-4 decision), rev'g, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), 345 F. Supp.
914 (E.D. Mich. 1972), 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
15. 338 F. Supp. 582, 587-92 (E.D. Mich. 1971). The district court found that the Detroit
Board of Education had created and maintained optional attendance zones within neighbor-
hoods undergoing racial transition and between attendance areas of a predominantly different
racial composition. Also, the school board drew attendance zone boundaries along north-
south lines in spite of the fact that an east-west drawing would have produced greater desegre-
gation. The school board bused black pupils to predominantly black schools, by-passing
nearer white schools. School construction had been such that the greater number of schools
had been built in all black or all white neighborhoods. The effect of all these actions was to
perpetuate segregation within the Detroit school system. The court held these actions of the
local school board attributable to the State of Michigan for purposes of state action. Id. at
587-92.
The district court also found that the State of Michigan had committed constitutional
violations in regard to its general supervision over public education. The state had failed to
transport students within Detroit, regardless of their poverty or distance from their assigned
schools until as late as 1971, while offering a full range of transportation to suburban students.
Most significant was the state legislature's passage of an act which had the effect of impeding
the Detroit School Board's voluntary plan of desegregation. Id. at 589.
16. 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972). The Detroit School District is surrounded by 85
suburban school districts. School district lines are not coterminous with political subdivision
boundaries. Id. at 934; 94 S. Ct. at 3151 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The district court ordered




tion of fostering segregation.' Nevertheless, the court stated that no actual
desegregation could be achieved within the Detroit school system unless
students were transported across school district lines. 8 This decision was
upheld on appeal" and subsequently the Supreme Court granted certior-
ari. 20
Considering the circumstances under which a federal court may impose
a multi-district areawide remedy to a single district de jure violation, the
Supreme Court reversed and held that a federal court is not empowered
to impose such a remedy unless acts of the state or local school district
have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation. 21 The lower court
decisions were attacked on the ground that they were based upon erroneous
standards. 2 For example, the district court had ordered that a remedy be
provided which reflected the racial proportion of the entire metropolitan
area in each classroom.? Previously the Supreme Court had expressly
rejected such racial balancing as not dictated by the equal protection
clause. 1
The core of the decision addressed the circumstances under which inter-
district relief could be granted in a school desegregation case. The Court
announced as its controlling principle an axiom earlier enunciated-the
nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy.2 Furthermore,
the constitutional right of black respondents residing in Detroit was to
attend unitary schools in their own school district." Interdistrict relief was
limited to situations where it is shown that a constitutional violation em-
braces more than one school district.? Since the Detroit district was the
17. 345 F. Supp. at 920.
18. Id. at 921-22.
19. 484 F.2d 215 (6tb Cir. 1973).
20. 414 U.S. 1038 (1973).
21. 94 S. Ct. at 3127.
22. Id, at 3125.
23. 345 F. Supp. at 918.
24. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), See note 6 supra.
The Court cited this holding in Milliken. 94 S. Ct. at 3125.
25. 94 S. Ct. at 3127. See also 402 U.S. at 16.
26. 94 S. Ct. at 3128.
27. The Court held that interdistrict relief is limited to situations where it is shown that
a constitutional violation within one district. . . produces a significant segregatory
effect in another district. Specifically, it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of
the state or local school districts, or of a single school district have been a substantial cause
of inter-district segregation." Id. at 3127. The Court cited examples of what type of activity
would call for an interdistrict remedy. Racially discriminatory acts of one or more school
districts which cause racial segregation in another district, or the deliberate drawing of school
district lines on the basis of race are violations calling for interdistrict relief. Id.
1975]
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only violator, the court limited any remedy to that district.,
Prior Supreme Court decisions demanded that actual desegregation be
achieved, and that any remedial decree should attempt to eliminate ra-
cially identifiable schools." The basic problem here was the undeniable
fact that any Detroit-only remedy would result in the creation of an
identifiable black school system in Detroit surrounded by all white subur-
ban school systems.3 0 The dictates of prior case law were relied on to re-
quire interdistrict relief to achieve the elimination of racially identifiable
schools.3 ' The Supreme Court pointed out that all of its prior decisions
involved only single district violations and single district relief 32
Another basis for interdistrict relief perceived by the lower courts in-
volved the responsibility of the state for the acts of de jure segregation
within the Detroit School District.3 Since the state had committed de jure
acts of segregation, it was within the power of the court to order the state
to restructure or ignore its school district boundaries, that remedy being
within the power of the state.3 4 The Supreme Court was unwilling to accept
such an expansion of the state action concept.3 The Court ruled that the
fact of the state's participation in fostering racially segregated schools
within Detroit provided no ground for ordering an interdistrict remedy
without a showing that an interdistrict segregatory effect had resulted.3
The Court found that during the late 1950's black students from a predominantly black
suburban district had been sent to a predominantly black high school in the Detroit School
District. The Court pointed out that this situation may have had an effect on the school
populations of the two districts but that such an isolated incident would not justify the broad
mandate of the lower court decisions. Id. at 3129-30.
28. The Court found specifically that none of the actions constituting de jure segregation
was an interdistrict violation having an interdistrict effect. The evidence revealed de jure
segregation only in the Detroit schools. Any remedy imposed on the outlying school districts
not shown to have committed a violation would be impermissible. Id. at 3127.
29. See generally Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green
v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
30. 484 F.2d at 245; 345 F. Supp. at 916.
31. See note 29 supra.
32. 94 S. Ct. at 3128.
33. See note 15 supra.
34. [T]he State has committed de jure acts of segregation and . .. the state con-
trols the instrumentalities whose action is necessary to remedy the harmful effects of
the State acts. . . . In the instant case the only feasible desegregation plan involves
the crossing of the boundary lines between the Detroit School District and adjacent or
nearby school districts . . . .484 F.2d at 249.
35. See note 13 supra.
36. 94 S. Ct. at 3128. In dissent Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Marshall defended the
proposition that the state's responsibility is to ignore school district boundary lines of its own
creation in effectuating a remedy for de jure segregation. Id. at 3139, 3158. Further, Mr.
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The Court was particularly concerned with the effect a contrary decision
would have on the established tradition of local school district control.
3 1
Coupled with the Court's earlier affirmance of a denial of relief,38 this
latest pronouncement reflects its reluctance to further expand the consti-
tutional doctrine in the school desegregation area. Rejection of an ex-
Justice Marshall felt that the Court utilized an unsatisfactory method of inquiry which
required not only that state action be found to trigger a violation, but that it also be found
to trigger a remedy. He stated that no second inquiry is necessary; rather once the primary
inquiry reveals a constitutional violation, the Court is duty-bound to formulate an effective
remedy. Id. at 3153-54 n.19.
37. No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control
over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to
the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools. . .. Id. at
3125.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the findings of the district court that the local school
district boundary lines in Michigan were simply arbitrary lines drawn for political conveni-
ence and therefore capable of being ignored for remedial purposes. See 484 F.2d at 244-45. In
his vigorous dissent, Mr. Justice Marshall remarked that:
[Tihe majority's emphasis on local governmental control and local autonomy of
school districts in Michigan will come as a surprise to those with any familiarity with
that State's system of education. 94 S. Ct. at 3151.
In fact, Michigan's educational system is peculiarly a state function with little control vested
in the local school board. See, e.g., Lansing School Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 367 Mich.
591, 116 N.W.2d 866 (1962).
38. Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd by an evenly divided Court,
412 U.S. 92 (1973). The Supreme Court in Bradley affirmed the decision of the 4th Circuit
Court of Appeals vacating an order by District Court Judge Merhige consolidating the school
district of Richmond, Virginia with those of Henrico and Chesterfield Counties for the pur-
poses of school integration. The court of appeals ruled that in the absence of any constitu-
tional violation in the establishment or maintenance of the three school districts, or of any
unconstitutional consequence of such maintenance, a federal court's authority did not extend
to such interference with the separate political subdivisions of the Commonwealth of Virginia.
It should be noted that the school district boundary lines in Virginia are coterminous with
her political subdivisions and are exclusively controlled by local authorities in contrast to the
situation in Michigan. See note 18 supra.
The Milliken and Bradley cases are the only school district merger cases which have
reached the Supreme Court. The disposition of each generally reflects the Court's lack of
reliance on school consolidation to remedy the metropolitan situation. The Milliken decision
is potentially more important, not only because a larger northern metropolitan area was
involved, but also because the two situations presented substantially different factual set-
tings. As opposed to the school district organizational plan in the Richmond area, Detroit area
school district lines do not reflect political subdivisions. Neither does Michigan educational
policy revolve around the local school district to the extent of Virginia policy.
See generally Smedley, Developments in the Law of School Desegregation, 26 VArn. L. REV.
405 (1973) (for a comparison of the Richmond and Detroit decisions at the intermediate
appellate stage); Note, Merging Urban and Suburban School Systems, 60 GEO. L.J. 1279,
1299 (1972) (an analysis of the district court decision in Bradley).
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panded state action approach and limiting remedies to a single school
district effectively quashes the hopes of those who had earlier perceived a
remedy to the racial demography of our large metropolitan areas." This
decision will accentuate the growing racial identity of our cities." The
interdistrict remedy may still be appropriate where the state is found
responsible for the residential segregation of a ietropolitan area.' In the
absence of such a finding any remedy is thereby severely limited in its
application.
W.R.T.
39. See note 9 supra.
40. Black school systems encourage an influx of more blacks into the system and generate
white flight from the cities to the suburbs. See 94 S. Ct. at 3153-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
41. See note 15 supra.
